Major R.J. Garcia served as a company commander in 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment between Camp Udairi, Kuwait, and the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) from January through July 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He begins his interview by noting that his unit had been newly equipped with the Longbow Apache and, because of a rotation through Operation Desert Spring, the unit's leadership was mentally prepared for the environment they were deploying to. He explains that flying in Kuwait was deliberately limited so the unit would be fresh for offensive operations and that training on the new L-model Hellfire missile was conducted because its performance was different from what they had previously trained for. When offensive operations began, their portion was moved forward, creating conflicts in the air plan and making for a hurried but well-rehearsed mission. Supporting primarily the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Garcia's battalion moved forward to Jalibah Airfield, dealing with problems of spotty communications, an uncertain picture of the enemy and the potential for fratricide. He says that the big lesson that attack aviation took away from the battle around Nasiriyah was that continuous support for any unit larger than a company would probably require the entire aviation battalion. During the great sandstorm, he and five other helicopters were forced to land in the desert and stay there for two days before they could return to Jalibah. Fighting at Karbala, Garcia explains that artillery and rockets provided most of the supporting fire and that their new radar systems worked superbly. He also says that the air mission brief is long and boring but essential for preparing to fly in a constrained environment, and recommends that company commanders should fly with his most experienced aviator, whoever that might be. After reaching BIAP, they were replaced in June by the 1st Armored Division which, according to Garcia, it was apparent that they had been rushed into theater. He repeatedly emphasizes that commanders have to continually monitor their soldiers for battlefield stress and ensure that they are properly preparing themselves mentally for combat. "Combat is scary for guys who've never been in it," says Garcia, "and it's even scarier for guys who have." He discusses the difference between their training environment, with concrete pads and barracks, with the expeditionary nature of their deployment. He closes the interview by urging all commanders to have someone they can talk to during operations and extolling the virtues of theoretical training.

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