Major Matthew Payne served as commander of Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, 3rd Infantry Division. 1-9 Field Artillery was direct support to the 3rd Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team in support of Operations Desert Spring and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from September 2002 to August 2003. Payne participated in training in Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Spring, fought during the drive to Baghdad in OIF I, transitioned to stability and support operations in Baghdad, moved with the 2nd BCT to Fallujah and then finally redeployed. During his second deployment, Payne served as a Rapid Equipping Force (REF) team leader for Combined Joint Task Force-76 with 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) from March 2006 to August 2006. In this interview, Payne begins by saying that he realized OIF I was beginning by witnessing the troop build-up at Camp Virginia and watching on television Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the United Nations. 1-9 FA fired some of the first shots of the war by targeting Iraqi observation posts located on the border with Kuwait. 1-9 FA was assigned a direct support role for 3rd Infantry Division and Payne describes some of the hard-fought battles at Najaf and Hillah en route to Baghdad. 1-9 FA was expecting to conduct military operations in urban terrain to secure Baghdad and was surprised at its quick fall. 1-9 FA transitioned to stability and support operations in Baghdad and Fallujah for the remainder of the deployment. Payne's second deployment was with a REF team assigned to Camp Salerno, Afghanistan. For this, Payne traveled extensively throughout the area of operations to assist units' leadership with equipment capability gaps and performing follow-up assessments. Payne also describes some of the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. In both deployments, Payne had praise for the officers and enlisted soldiers he served with and gives many examples of the caliber of soldier that goes above and beyond the normal call of duty. Payne closes his interview by recommending the Army provide more cultural cross-training, as the cultural training he received was minimal and contained some misinformation because it was not tailored to the location he served in. Payne stated that the best cultural cross-training was done by 1-9 FA’s competent translator, which eased contact with the Iraqis.

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