Major Corey Crosbie was an observer-controller at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany, when a US Army Europe (USAEUR) request for volunteers drew his attention in November 2005. An armor officer, he joined a team headed for duty as a special police transition team (SPTT) with the Iraqi National Police. Predeployment training took place at the training center, emphasizing combatives, cultural awareness and staff training for 60 days. Crosbie felt that more attention should have focused on negotiation and mediation skills. Additionally, their team experience would have benefited from more language and cultural training. Communications and vehicle training suffered from a lack of theater-specific equipment, corrected once the team got to Iraq in February 2006. The teams from USAEUR deployed through Kuwait - receiving training on tactics, techniques and procedures from MPRI contractors - en route to Taji, Iraq, and the Phoenix Academy. Crosbie's 11-man team - of which he was the chief - stayed together from initial training until their linkup with an outgoing team in Baghdad. The relief in place/transfer of authority took place in a hurried fashion and Crosbie's battalion transition team found time with their Iraqi counterparts shortchanged. The Iraqi National Police unit Crosbie's SPTT advised was a special commando unit operating in the battlespace of the 4th Infantry Division's 4th Brigade. Initially based in Baghdad, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior soon sent this special commando battalion to Samarra into the battlespace of the 101st Airborne Division and later the 82nd. Advisory and training activities competed often with operational requirements. Crosbie's team found itself often involved in sustainment issues on behalf of their Iraqi unit for food, fuel and survivability equipment like body armor. Sectarian tensions between the largely Shi'a police and the Sunni population of Samarra were a constant. During this tour, Crosbie's team saw three battalion commanders come and go, the first one killed by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. Command and staff training took place under fire as operations planned and conducted were against live targets. NCO development was a critical undertaking by Crosbie's team concurrent with training and operations. Working through their interpreters, the SPTT worked through an intensive year of train, plan, execute, review, adjust and receive a new mission. The experiences of Crosbie's team indicated that foreign internal defense tasks can rightly be done by motivated conventional soldiers. Transition teams could profitably be larger, too, which would allow more attention to be paid to developing Iraqi counterparts and their units. Crosbie's SPTT left Iraq in February 2007.

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