From June through November 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Doug Lilly - a foreign area officer - supported Operation Enduring Freedom from Kabul as the regional engagement cell chief of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan's political-military integration cell, tasked mainly with coordinating between the armies of Pakistan and Afghanistan in such areas as theater security cooperation and the Tripartite Commission, which sought to foster closer ties (including exchange training programs) between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US. These were accomplished primarily by means of strategic-level meetings held every 60 days with military principals of each of the three countries and focused on three major issues: border security, military intelligence sharing and countering improvised explosive devices. "If you have these guys sitting down talking to each other and building relationships," Lilly explained, "then you're influencing entire armies. That's what a lot of this is focused on." He also worked closely with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the overall US commander and the American representative at several of the Tripartite Commission meetings. In addition to his daily duties, which he talks about in great detail, Lilly shares his insights into the complex Pakistani-Afghan relationship, made all the more difficult today by the "very deep and historical mistrust" between the two countries. He points out, too, the ramifications of Pakistan's strategic focus being not on the border with Afghanistan but rather oriented towards their "primary enemy," i.e. India. Reflecting on his political-military experiences and extensive work with foreign armies, Lilly said that, "The US is the only place where we think we can just zip in, meet and greet, sit down and do business, and then head off. Europe is not that way. Afghanistan is especially not that way and neither are the Paks. You have to sit down, talk to these people and work with them." Lilly also talks about transitioning the Tripartite Commission over to NATO control, how NGOs can have a skewed view of the security situation, the steep educational and cultural learning curve he faced, as well as (in his estimation) the amount of time the US is going to need to remain in Afghanistan.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited