From December 2005 through December 2006, Major Tony Nichols served as the military transition team (MiTT) leader assigned to coach, teach and mentor two different Iraqi Army units: initially the 1st Iraqi Division Motor Transport Regiment and then, later, 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division - a T-72 tank-equipped battalion. Based on his predeployment position as a combat arms analyst in Fort Leavenworth's Force Design Division, Nichols begins his interview by discussing the Army's move towards modularity, then goes into how he got tasked and eventually trained for this MiTT mission. Based in Numaniyah and Habbaniyah and given the mission to stand this Iraqi MTR up from scratch, Nichols said the fact that neither he nor any of his team members were transportation officers or NCOs didn't matter. "You can take a second lieutenant out of his basic course and he knows more than an Iraqi colonel," Nichols noted. "So, anybody can do this; it's just understanding the ground you're walking on." Observing that the whole standing up of Iraqi units was definitely a "political animal" in that the timeframes were severely constrained, Nichols and his MiTT were nonetheless able to get their MTR trained and deployed to their battlespace, even while admitting he himself was "professionally horrified" the entire time. Midway through his tour, Nichols transitioned over to the armor battalion MiTT, this one based in Taji. From his experiences there, he offers a wealth of thoughtful recommendations to Big Army as well as hard-earned advice for future US advisors, from suggestions on how best to maximize training time and get the best results, to driving home the reality that MiTTs aren't there any longer to simply train their Iraqi units: "Your job is to fight," he insisted. Nichols also discusses his work with interpreters; why he thinks that the "biggest mistake we made bar none was to [initially] disband the Iraqi Army"; the nature of combat operations he and his Iraqi battalion were involved in; the endemic corruption he had to contend with; and why he had no qualms about having so many former Republican Guard soldiers in this re-constituted Iraqi armor battalion. In addition, Nichols talks about why he feels this unit was the "best battalion in the Iraqi Army"; the "completely unqualified" reservist lieutenant colonel who ultimately replaced him as MiTT leader; why we absolutely need to send our top US Army officers and NCOs to serve as advisors; the fact that, despite claims to the contrary, the advisory mission was manifestly not the coalition point of main effort during his tenure; and the "adversarial relationship" his MiTT had with its partner US cavalry squadron. Indeed, Nichols said, as a MiTT member he was seen as a foreigner by US commanders. "I became an Iraqi in their eyes, not an American soldier. So they began to treat me and my team, and all the MiTTs, with the same passive disdain that they would treat the Iraqi soldiers." In closing, Nichols stresses that by understanding the Iraqis' religion and their battle rhythm, advisors will be "75 percent of the way there" to understanding the Iraqis themselves.

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