In this third of three interviews, Major Tom Chalkley, US Marine Corps, discusses his deployment to Habbaniyah, Iraq, as the leader of a military transition team (MiTT) throughout 2006 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Chalkley's team was scheduled to deploy in April 2006 but it was moved up to January, forcing the team to miss Mohave Viper, the Marine Corps' predeployment exercise for everyone going to Iraq. He was also unable to deploy with his whole team when one member contracted a disease during Christmas leave and had to catch up with the team in Iraq. Despite these early obstacles, Chalkley says they were not really a factor because his team members were very mature, very open-minded, eager to get into the fight, and top-notch individuals. He notes that his team flew over with a large number of other MiTTs but it seemed as though no one was expecting their arrival and they spent a good deal of time sitting around. Speaking of the Phoenix Academy to train MiTTs, Chalkley says, "Ours was more like an ad hoc, thrown together kind of deal run by the Army National Guard. There were a lot of redundant classes we had already had and none of the classes were specific to our area of operations," adding that predeployment site surveys for MITT leaders would have been much more beneficial. He replaced a severely under-resourced team, had a positive introduction to the Iraqi battalion's leadership - that being 2nd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Arm Division - and noted that a common military culture aided in establishing a very functional relationship. He says that he was impressed with the Iraqis' ability to plan and conduct small-unit operations, and that his challenges throughout the deployment were reducing their rigidity in schedules and operating patterns and to make them logistically self-sustaining. He explains that at first the Iraqis treated their NCOs as glorified privates, but when faced with a severe shortage of officers, they found that NCOs filled leadership positions very well. Members of the MiTT always accompanied operations where enemy contact seemed likely so as to provide supporting arms, and they never had to worry about divided loyalties from the Iraqi soldiers because they were all Shi'as in Sunni Anbar, noting that they were even provided an unofficial protection detail. Chalkley states that support for the MiTTs was excellent, with the exception of interpreters, which were horrible. His 11-man team suffered eight casualties during the deployment, and he says you have to expect the unexpected and prepare to take casualties. He closes by saying the Marine Corps should emphasize language training as a low-cost, long-term way to prepare for counterinsurgency operations.

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