Major Jason Dempsey deployed from the US Military Academy's Department of Social Sciences to Operation Iraqi Freedom from May 2005 until August 2005. A graduate of West Point himself, Dempsey was an infantry officer but deployed to a post in the Political, Military and Economic (PME) Assessment Division, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). He judged the predeployment training at the CONUS Replacement Center as redundant for Regular Army personnel, but probably necessary for Reserve Component soldiers without current active duty. Cultural sensitivity training was especially lacking without any specific Iraq orientation or knowledge. Once in country, Dempsey served as a policy officer at MNF-I, responsible for interacting with the State Department on a range of issues, including judicial and development matters. The PME Division also dealt with non-governmental organizations and the UN as required. Policy officers essentially had a portfolio that encompassed all of these areas. In the area of judicial issues, Dempsey took part in an investigation of a March 2005 Washington Post article that alleged that the largely Kurdish Iraqi Security Forces in Kirkuk had culpability in the disappearance of Iraqi-Arabs taken into custody. Other policy issues included relations with allies from Bulgaria and the United Kingdom, sensitive to public opinion in their respective countries. It was the complexity of interagency and combined operations in the Kurdish north that occupied most of Dempsey's tour. State Department and NGO operations within northern Iraq required constant attention. The constant turnover of action officers and counterparts mirrored the rotation of units, US and allied. For the Iraqis, it was home. New power relationships asserted themselves among the ethnic, tribal and political forces vying for influence over the execution of reconstruction. The US Agency for International Development became a hub of activity because of their control over funds. Nation-building skills were also in short supply. Despite by then the US military having been a decade in the Balkans, Dempsey found the Army's inch-deep understanding of the influence of genuine cultural awareness sadly lacking. Additionally disappointing was the rapid emergence of bureaucratic wrangling and turf struggles that complicated but did not aid mission accomplishment. Dempsey expressed a concern that Army and interagency professional education should reflect such skills that nation-building requires as an option for officers.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited