As part of his research for a Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper on the so-called Second Lebanon War of 2006 - a 34-day conflict fought principally between Israel and the paramilitary forces of Hezbollah - historian Matt Matthews of Fort Leavenworth's Combat Studies Institute interviewed Brigadier General (Ret.) Shimon Naveh, the founder and former head of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). Moreover, Naveh is the man most associated, often controversially so, with what has been described as a major intellectual transformation of the IDF in terms of how it thinks about, prepares for and ultimately wages war. "I read a comment made by an analyst that it was very hard to learn," said Naveh, who also holds a PhD in war studies from King's College, London. "You know," he added, "wars are very hard to fight and yet we go and fight them. If indeed this is crucial and important, it is not an option. We should go and do it…. All you need is some intellectual stamina, some energy. If you're serious about your profession, then you'll go through it." Indeed, Naveh singles out the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, for significant criticism for his alleged lack of understanding of the doctrine he signed which, as Naveh contends, contributed mightily to what is widely considered a defeat of the IDF by Hezbollah, as did a similar ignorance among the vast majority of the IDF General Staff. One of the leaders actually removed from his position, though, as a result of the defeat - the Division 91 commander, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, also a former OTRI student - was singled out for praise from Naveh as "the most creative thinker, the most subversive thinker and the victim of this entire affair." More broadly, Naveh discusses the "asymmetric dual" that was the Second Lebanon War from both the Israeli and Hezbollah perspectives, explaining why he feels the IDF was "totally unprepared for this kind of operation"; why its post-2000 intifada struggles against the Palestinians had the effect of "corrupting" the force; and why only understanding, embracing and then executing what he calls the "operational art" of war can prevent an army from becoming harmfully "addicted to the present fight." Herein, too, he says, lies a warning for the US military that finds itself at present waging a primarily counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the time of the interview, in fact, Naveh was at Fort Leavenworth in his capacity as a part-time consultant to the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies.

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