The Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) commander for 4-64 Armor, part of 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division in 2002-2003, Major Jeff Powell deployed with his company to Kuwait in November 2002 to join the CONUS Crisis Response Force training mission and later participated in the major ground combat phase and immediate aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom before redeploying in July 2003. In this interview, he begins by discussing the full range of pre-war training exercises he did in Kuwait and says that, in hindsight, far more focus should have been placed on urban operations and cultural preparation. He then moves into a wide variety of supply, maintenance and ammunition issues, the latter of which he said was the most important resource he concerned himself with. Powell talks about the drive north to Baghdad and how he managed to arrive in the Iraqi capital with 147 of the 149 vehicles he crossed the border with. Present when the 2nd Brigade tactical operations center got hit by the Iraqi FROG missile, he touches on that as well as the near-total lack of repair parts and the related problem, in his estimation, of logisticians not being trained to the proper level of expertise. Powell later discusses his unit's move to Habbaniyah, the challenges he faced with respect to force protection, his work with British Special Air Service soldiers, his contact with local Iraqis and various media figures, some seminal leadership lessons he learned, the conduct of stability and support operations, the impact that in-country changes of command had, and his overall assessment that not planning for the worst case scenario negatively impacted the coalition's effectiveness with Phase IV operations. More specifically, he shares his thoughts on the perceived failings of Ambassador Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and his team, who, according to Powell, "get a gold star for creating crises just so they could manage them." In closing, Powell says that we need to give our adversaries more credit for their fighting prowess, that junior leaders need to be junior leaders for longer periods of time, and that promoting soldiers too fast will do long-term harm to the US Army.

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