In this second of two interviews with Major Michael Doherty concerning his Global War on Terrorism experiences, he discusses his work on the Force Planning and Integration Team in the Department of the Army, Military Operations-War Plans Division (DAMO-SSW) and then his May 2005 to May 2006 deployment to Iraq as a battalion military transition team (MiTT) chief. He begins by talking about the predeployment training he received at Fort Carson, Colorado - or, more accurately, that which he didn't receive regarding how to actually be an advisor to indigenous forces - and how he had to meet members of his 10-man (and later nine-man) MiTT only two weeks prior to arriving in theater. Once in Iraq, Doherty's MiTT was assigned to 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division and was partnered with the US Army's 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, out of 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. He said he didn't feel his MiTT was received well by his US partnership battalion and admitted to being "shocked" that he had to actually work hard to build rapport with fellow American soldiers. Doherty discusses the unique arrangement whereby he was able to work with a Special Forces battalion augmentation transition team (BATT), which concerned itself with company- and platoon-level training of the Iraqi battalion while his MiTT dealt with battalion staff functions, resulting over time in marked improvement at the small unit tactical level. Doherty also discusses problems he faced in terms of corruption, a wide variety of cultural relations challenges, as well as the difficulties he had to contend with given the "major ethnic fault lines" that were present in their area of operations south of Mosul. "They were constantly plotting against one another and making false accusations," said Doherty, describing senior Iraqi officers from battalion to division level - an environment, he adds, that was hardly conducive to building a cohesive military organization. That said, by the time Doherty's MiTT redeployed, the Iraqi battalion had successfully assumed responsibility for the battlespace. "My number one priority at all times," he said, "was trying to develop a capability where that battalion could be self-reliant, capable and have the support and trust of the community to do the right thing, and then start chipping away at all the other things we considered inappropriate." In closing, Doherty reiterates his frustrations due to an at times friction-filled relationship with his partnership US battalion. He also explains why he thinks "we've gone about this MiTT thing entirely wrong," lays out the danger of using what he calls "outsourced MiTTs," and stresses the need to achieve real unity of effort and purpose between MiTTs and their partnership units.

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