Staff Sergeant Steven Jackson was a Reserve Component soldier who reenlisted on his fiftieth birthday in 2003 after a sixteen-year break in service. After a valuable predeployment train-up at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, he mobilized at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion. At Fort Bragg the unit received more training then deployed to Iraq for duty with the 1st Cavalry Division on 24 September 2004. Serving with the government support team (GST) of the division, Jackson commented on the time lag between training emphasis in the United States and tactical requirements in theater. He would later serve with the 3rd Infantry Division and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), departing from Iraq on or about 29 June 2005. Jackson served in Iraq at the same time as his son and daughter. Baghdad Province was Jackson's primary area of operations with the GST, aiding Iraqi farmers on agricultural issues like irrigation. He felt that US Army National Guard soldiers he sometimes encountered had a better feel for such non-kinetic reconstruction duties than their Regular Army counterparts. Active Component battalions and brigades seemed reluctant to share information and knowledge about the execution and effectiveness of reconstruction and development projects in their areas of operation. This lack of a knowledge system complicated relief operations, which was also hampered by Iraqi corruption as well as communications and logistical challenges. Jackson expressed his concern that careerism - especially among Reserve officers - affected mission accomplishment as well as morale, as senior officers seemed reluctant to sanction poor performance with efficiency reports. Poor performers affected Active Component/Reserve Component relations. As such, officers found themselves unwanted and at times their units as well. The enthusiasm and proficiency of individual soldiers, though, continued to provide critical connections among units at the tactical level. At times, unfamiliarity with civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities among Active Component units - who do not routinely have access to these capabilities that reside primarily in the Reserve Component - also created friction and slowed application of such non-kinetic tools. Working with the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, Jackson continued to work with Iraqis as well as with USAID officials and third-country aid workers on agricultural issues. The small number of interpreters and security conditions affected the ongoing pace of reconstruction. Institutional tensions also existed. As new Army units rotated into Iraq with a kinetic orientation, according to Jackson, these units were often in conflict with the largely non-kinetic requirements of stability operations. Frequent adaptation was the order of the day, from dealing with wheat suppliers from Australia and Syria to disbursing hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash for procurement. Jackson felt that the insurgents often appropriated the message of American assistance to Iraqi reconstruction and development, at the least complicating information operations.

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