During the course of his February 2003 to February 2004 deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Major Robert A. Mason had two company commands in the 101st Airborne Division: the first, until May 2003, with Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery - part of 2nd Brigade Combat Team/502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment; the second, for the remainder of his tour, with the battalion's Headquarters and Service Battery. In this interview, Mason discusses numerous firing missions (numbering some 650 rounds) in Najaf, Hillah, Kifl, Karbala, Baghdad and ultimately Mosul, and talks about firing many more extended range munitions that they'd initially anticipated and also the engaging of targets from as close as 1,000 meters. In fact, once combat operations ceased, his BCT occupied positions in Mosul and began conducting stability and support operations there, and Mason, as a battery commander, was given an area of the city to patrol, secure and assist the local populace - doing everything from digging wells to refurbishing schools. Mason himself got tasked with being what he called the commander in chief of gas (CINCGAS) and controlled all the benzene and propane distribution for northwest Mosul. In addition, he discusses his work with interpreters and shares his assessment that "the violence in Mosul increased the day our government decided to disband the Iraqi Army and tell them they had no future in Iraq. Up to that point, we had made some pretty significant progress, but once that decision was made things got more violent." Mason also talks about the overarching problem of corruption and his struggles to combat decades of damage done by Saddam Hussein's socialist government in terms of the Iraqi people's individual initiative and willingness to work. Despite these and many other challenges, Mason calls this deployment "the most professionally rewarding year of my military career," although he does offer one key piece of constructive criticism: "If I could make one recommendation," he said, "it would be that we're lacking in the area of information operations and the ability to tell our story to the American public and the Arab world about our intentions, our goals and our objectives. It's not what we want to see in Iraq; it's what the Iraqis want to see in Iraq and what they want it to become. We need to improve our means and effectiveness of the information campaign that's being employed at the strategic and national levels. Right now, I don't think it's very effective at all."

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