From August 2003 through January 2004, Major Ronald Beadenkopf - as the liaison from NSA Georgia to Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) on Camp Victory, Iraq- provided reachback signals intelligence (SIGINT) support to CJTF-7 with regards to SIGINT equipment fielding and support. Working specifically with Cryptologic Services Group-Baghdad as the national tactical interface, he also assisted with the integration and training of new and existing purpose-built collection capabilities against the insurgency, as part of the effort to orient all national tactical resources to go after the insurgent threat. "Here we are," said Beadenkopf, "we have billions and billions of dollars of resources and efforts focused on a conventional threat, and all of a sudden we have to conduct a hard right to go after an unconventional threat, so that required an awful lot of money, resources and time. But again, we're faced with a very fast-moving enemy who doesn't just sit there while we come up with a plan and take a lot of time to flesh it all out." For his second tour in Iraq, this one from February 2005 to January 2006, Beadenkopf served as the SIGINT officer in charge for 3rd Infantry Division. He was responsible for employment, fielding and maintenance of SIGINT infrastructure; for the division's SIGINT collection strategy; for exploitation of SIGINT, analysis, reporting and dissemination; for integrating the SIGINT collection plan into the division's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plan; and for working with national-level agencies and special operating force communities to facilitate time-sensitive targeting of insurgent cells and networks in the 3rd Infantry Division area of operations. "We spent a lot of time," Beadenkopf explained, "helping our boss in predictive analysis to try and assist the division commander to identify what the enemy was up to, what his plans were, where he might attack next, how to interdict and get inside his decision cycle and all those things. For me it was an incredible experience from a tactical perspective because I got to work with all the other 'INTs." Beadenkopf also discusses the too-short amount of time (from an intelligence perspective) that is allocated for the handover process; the critical period that is a unit's first 100 days in theater; the benefits of being the "600-pound gorilla" in theater and rapidly getting requests for support filled; how vital it is to understand the culture in which you're operating; the dangers of underestimating one's enemies; the highly intelligence-driven fight that Iraq has become; as well as how he came away feeling he'd earned a "master's degree in tactical SIGINT support to counterinsurgency."

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