Still in command of Tactical PSYOP Detachment 980 - part of Charlie Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion - Major John Adams, in this second interview reference his Global War on Terrorism deployments, discusses his January to June 2003 tour in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the initial ground war phase, Adams' unit was tasked with two primary missions: "surrender appeals to bad guys and civilian non-interference broadcasts. We were just saying things like, 'Americans coming through. Stay in your homes.' We weren't doing strategic PSYOP where we were dropping leaflets trying to get a certain division to surrender or leave. It was all tactical. My guys were integrated with the maneuver battalions. We were there in the fight. That's hard to do but as a concept it's not very complicated." Assigned to Colonel Daniel Allyn's 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Adams explains that among his first challenges was establishing rapport and getting himself and his 13-man detachment integrated with (and accepted by) the brigade leadership. Going into combat as a slice element and not knowing the people to your right and left, he said, makes for a difficult situation but one that must be quickly overcome. He then discusses a number of issues related to interpreters and effectively communicating PSYOP messages to one's intended audiences; talks about his detachment's role during the march north - from Kuwait, to Tallil, As Samawah, the Karbala Gap and finally to Baghdad; and then transitions to a discussion of how his detachment's responsibilities changed as Phase III major combat became Phase IV stability and support operations. Engaged with civilian infrastructure assessments and the dissemination of command information, Adams nonetheless believes that his detachment was not as productive or effective as it could have been. "It seemed almost like we were looking ahead to do other things - like the elections stuff that some of the battalions were messing with - before we fixed the basic problems. We were focused on a wide variety of tasks when we really should have been focused on security." As he noted, though, "It didn't seem obvious at the time." Adams also talks about the Army Reserve PSYOP unit that replaced his and says that, in his estimation, they were far from enthusiastic about assuming the mission. In closing, Adams reveals what he considers some conventional commanders' unrealistic expectations of civil affairs and PSYOP in the immediate wake of the Hussein regime's fall. "It seemed to me," he said, that "once the regime fell, all these commanders turned to the CA guys and said, 'Go fix all this stuff. Do whatever you have to do so we can get out of here.' I don't think that process was planned or executed very well."

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