In this first of three interviews reference his Global War on Terrorism deployments, Major Greg Ford relates his experiences serving as the intelligence officer of 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry in Jacobabad, Pakistan, and Paktia Province, Afghanistan from 2002 through 2003 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Ford begins by noting that the battalion staff practiced the military decision-making process a great deal before deploying, something which paid dividends later. Because the battalion was initially deployed to Pakistan as security for an airbase, they were not allowed to bring their Delta Company or any of their normal fire support personnel. Upon arriving at Jacobabad, Ford reports that the handoff went very smoothly, saying, "The Marines are probably one of the most professional groups ever," and further explains that a quick transfer of authority was their ticket home. The battalion suffered from some culture shock, not just from dealing with the Pakistanis but also from the significantly different standards of the Air Force, who owned the airbase. In addition to normal security duties at Jacobabad, the battalion received small tasks which detached various portions of the unit to Afghanistan. Somewhat shorthanded, the battalion was brought into the planning for Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan's Paktia Province late in the process. Ford readily admits that he bought into all of the intelligence estimates leading into the operation, explaining that no one expected them to stand and fight because of their recent delaying fights, ignoring the Taliban's history of success in the Shah-i-Kot Valley. Throughout the operation, they suffered from single-band communications of all sorts, forcing most talk to the commander-to-commander level at the expense of the staff sections. To provide his companies with usable maps, Ford used FalconView to download imagery from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's webpage, naming the villages and numbering the buildings for ease of use. He recalls a great deal of detail regarding his battalion's actions during the operation, including the helpful role the Canadians played and an incident in which mules used by the enemy for resupply were shot by snipers. Ford states that the biggest issue of the battle was the ad hoc nature of command and control above the battalion level. He does note that most of the mistakes made during Anaconda were not repeated during the later Operation Mountain Lion. Ford closes by saying, "The joint world is great, but if you're a jerk, you get nothing," that efforts should never be duplicated, and that intelligence products need to be useful at the platoon level.

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