Dr. Joseph J. Collins is a professor of national security strategy at the National War College. He previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations from July 2001 through July 2004, under the George W. Bush Administration. He writes articles and speaks publicly about the positives and negatives of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the mistakes made on the part of the US government, according to Dr Collins, were inadequate troop strength, poor planning and poor reaction to the insurgency. Politically, he said, "We did not quickly move as we did in Afghanistan to having an interim Iraqi authority and, as a result, the perception of occupation increased radically." Dr. Collins noted that there are significant steps underway to correct those mistakes, though, one being the emphasis now placed on the importance of stability and counterinsurgency operations within the military. Collins also feels that with putting the State Department in charge of post-conflict operations came the responsibility of properly funding and manning it. Collins believes that the major problem with planning was lack of a coordinated effort between Central Command and Combined Forces Land Component Command. There was no one to oversee the whole effort. Additionally he states that there was a general sense that the US wouldn't be in Iraq for peacekeeping operations, so in some instances plans simply did not exist. Collins also commented on the "light footprint" concept, stating that the positive aspect was that there was a smaller chance of US troops being viewed as occupiers, though this happened anyway. The negative was that insurgents then did not view the US troops as a formidable opponent, and their confidence was therefore greater than if more troops had been present.

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