Having served two tours of duty during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Colonel Richard O. Hatch brings a unique perspective to the War on Terrorism. First, he was staff judge advocate for the 101st Airborne Division, reporting to (then) Major General David Petraeus. And secondly, from June 2004 until June 2005, as staff judge advocate for Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), he once again reported to (then) Lieutenant General Petraeus. Hatch is currently the chief of the Army's Litigation Division in Arlington, Virginia. This interview primarily addresses Hatch's accomplishments with MNSTC-I, however a few 101st anecdotes creep in. Prior to joining MNSTC-I, Hatch thoroughly familiarized himself with the basic documents that formed the fundamental legal basis for MNSTC-I operations. Since MNSTC-I was a new organization and he was to be the first staff judge advocate, there was no predecessor from whom to learn the ropes. Although he basically began applying general legal principles to this unique setting, his earlier tour in Iraq gave him a strong running start in understanding the environmental, cultural and other issues that arose. As an example, the Coalition Provisional Authority heretofore had been responsible for purchasing (on contract) large quantities of arms, ammunition and other military equipment for the new Iraqi security forces. The CPA, however, ceased to exist as of 28 June 2004. Hatch decided that the new Iraqi government must now become responsible for the dozens of outstanding contracts for goods and services desperately needed by the Iraqis. He next determined who in the new government should sign the contractual documents and then hand carried them around the country to the various officials for signature. Similarly, Hatch was faced with another interesting legal issue in what he refers to as the "battalion sets" contract for basic equipment to outfit 30 new Iraqi battalions. A portion of this contract had been subcontracted to a Chinese state-owned firm to provide AK47 rifles. This became a political hot potato. Congressional delegations wanted to know why we weren't buying American equipment to give to the Iraqis. Hatch argued (1) that Chinese AK47s were cheaper and more quickly available, (2) that Iraqis were already accustomed to using Soviet-style weapons and (3) that state-of-the-art US weapons in the hands of freshly trained Iraqi forces might simply disappear or end up being used against us. Hatch later describes the CENTCOM order recognizing MNSTC-I as an official military command, General Petraeus' promotion, mentoring his Iraqi legal counterparts, US transition teams, the extensive variety of Iraqi forces, relations with the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense, the vetting process, metrics for measuring progress, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Phoenix Base, outlying schools and training academies, corruption, sustainment costs, infrastructure deterioration, opening the Syrian border for trade and the courageousness of the Iraqi people.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited