Interview with MAJ Joseph Halloran, Part II
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Interview with MAJ Joseph Halloran, Part II
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From February through September 2006 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Major Joseph Halloran served as the operations and intelligence officer for the Joint Area Support Group in the International Zone, Baghdad. Halloran found himself operating from the American Embassy compound primarily coordinating with the State Department, other multinational forces, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and an American infantry battalion which provided security for the zone. He describes the culture shock of working with the State Department as significant. The accommodations, from his single-occupancy trailer with a shower and flush toilet to the gym to the food and coffee shops, were far more luxurious than anything he had experienced in his 2003 deployment to Iraq. He notes that, while the State Department is populated with many brilliant people, there is no mentorship of junior members and they are entirely reliant on the military to do all the planning and execution of any complex operation. He describes how the colonel he worked for aided him immensely by explaining how please, thank you and "How can I help you?" worked better when interacting with the State Department. While working in the International Zone, Halloran states that the United Nations was a very difficult organization to work with because they were inflexible and sometimes irrational, saying, "It was like dealing with spoiled children." He says it was difficult to gain any sense of accomplishment because he was operating at "echelons above reality." He recommends that anyone headed for a similar assignment should read more about the Arabic language and culture and practice their writing skills. Halloran closes by saying that the Army has to stop being so risk averse, take off some armor and meet some of the local people, and do away with the super forward operating bases which have promoted the mentality of fighting a "commuter war." Adds Halloran: "These super FOBs have done us more damage in a holistic sense and the concept of a super FOB is more damaging to the war effort than any Abu Ghraib or Haditha incident could ever be."
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