Major Thomas Clinton Jr., US Marine Corps, deployed to Afghanistan in April 2004 to lead a 13-man embedded training team assigned to coach, teach and mentor the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Afghan National Army Brigade, which was considered a commando unit. By the time he and his fellow Marines got in country to begin their six-month tour, the commandos "were in combat operations and they were pretty well versed in what they were doing"; and in fact, said Clinton, "Fifteen days after we arrive in country, my guys are with companies in combat operations as a part of Task Force 31, which was a Special Forces task force operating out of Kandahar. So there went the 'strictly training' thing. Fifteen days into it, my guys were coming under fire from whatever the action was - ambushes, raids, anything like that." Attached to Task Force Phoenix, Clinton explains why he thinks that this parent organization "never accepted the fact … that we had gone into combat operations" and the ramifications thereof. He discusses a wide variety of cultural relations issues and draws upon his knowledge of recent Afghan history - particularly the era of Soviet involvement - to offer a number of thoughtful insights into not only his own experience but also the course of the country over the past several years, his thoughts on its future and the many challenges we face and will face for a long time to come. Clinton further talks about his work with and visibility on a number of Special Forces units, the manifold difficulties he had obtaining necessary equipment, how higher headquarters often did not have an adequate understanding of the real-world problems he and his team had to deal with and which periodically required them to do what "Marines have probably done throughout the centuries - begging, borrowing or stealing from anywhere we could." Reflecting on the training his team provided the Afghan soldiers - and how accepting they were of it - Clinton stresses (among many other pieces of advice) that advisors should by no means try to make a US soldier or Marine out of them. "You're making them a good soldier, a good fighter who can do the basics," he said. "You could try to impart some of your ethos and stuff on them, but you have to do it within their culture." He also offers suggestions for how to avoid cultural or religious minefields and describes what he calls the "classic counterinsurgency" nature of his Afghan battalion's operations.

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