From 2002 through 2004, Mr. Gene Del Bianco served as the US Department of State's political-military advisor in the US Embassy in Kuwait and, in this capacity, he said, "One of the major issues I was dealing with in my portfolio was the planning for before, during and after Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Not so much militarily, but I was liaising with the host nation government of Kuwait and was also concerned with Phase IV (reconstruction and stabilization) operations planning." Briefing and working in close proximity with a plethora of senior military and civilian leaders, Del Bianco - also a US Army Reserve officer with the rank of major - reflects on his interactions with everyone from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Central Command commander, General Tommy Franks, to numerous US senators and congressmen. "Later on once military operations kicked off," he added, "I had the privilege of dealing with and briefing General Jay Garner and his group - the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)." About ORHA, though, Del Bianco described the initial group Garner brought in as "well intentioned, well meaning and well out of its league." As he further explained, "It was both frustrating for me and very much of an eye opener to talk to General Garner and realize that, wait a second, he's brought in some very senior people, maybe 30 or 40. But where are all the Indians; where are all the worker bees? He's just brought in senior people, and sadly enough more than a few retirees who, in my opinion and in the opinion of many others, seemed totally out of place in both their skills sets for the positions they were assigned to and in the environment in which they were working." In addition, Del Bianco admits that many of his State Department colleagues "weren't as attuned to the military as they should be." He also shares his observations on postwar planning and the impact of not having a "cadre of solid, experienced" Foreign Service officers willing to serve in Iraq. Reflecting as well on his later experiences as a political advisor to three provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, Del Bianco comments at length on PRTs in both concept and execution, critically considering both their advantages and disadvantages. Asked for his outlook on Iraq in the months and years to come, Del Bianco says that, while he wishes he "could make some sort of pronouncement and say what's going to happen," he knows enough "about the current situation in Iraq to know that I don't know. As for others, I can't believe anyone who says they do know really understands the complexity of this issue."

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