Captain Paul Toolan served as the assistant operations officer for 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group while deployed to Afghanistan in 2005. In this interview, he discusses at length four different battles fought by Special Forces (SF) in the summer of 2005 in Afghanistan. Of the four, Toolan identifies the fight at Mari Ghar as the one which stands out because it displays the decisions and actions of the operational detachment alpha (ODA) in contact, those of a separate ODA maneuvering to assist, and those of the higher headquarters as it tries to bring in the quick reaction force (QRF) and AH-64 helicopters as additional support. The fight at Shomali Shin Ghar is significant, according to Toolan, from a tactical operations center perspective, showing how decisions are made, how the rules of engagement affect the tactical situation, and at what level some decisions are made. After an American soldier was killed in the fighting at Siah Chow, all levels of command took note of the situation and heavy resources were brought to bear, exemplifying how sensitive the American command structure is to casualties. The fight at Ghali Ghaz showed how unclear a tactical situation can appear to a commander, the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe, and the indispensable nature of airpower to the effective operation of small SF teams in the field. Toolan reiterates throughout the SF point of view that Afghanistan is between Phases I and II of an insurgency, not in Phase IV as maintained by the combined joint task force (CJTF). He highlights the situation wherein SF teams are spread so thin that they must rely on a QRF from the CJTF for support, obtainable only after the presentation of the tactical situation via PowerPoint slides. Toolan notes that reliable interpreters are indispensable in identifying insurgents, explaining local political divisions and intercepting enemy radio transmissions. He also touts the capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces, trained by the SF and used as a surrogate force, and denigrates the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Toolan also explains that opposition can come from al-Qaeda, Taliban, local militia temporarily hired by the enemy, or criminals defending heroin-producing areas. Additionally, he gives examples of how, even in very dangerous circumstances, forces in chaotic environments can encounter truly comical situations.

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