Brigadier General James Schwitters was the commanding general of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team from June 2004 to June 2005 when the 98th Division (Institutional Training) deployed to Iraq to assume the foreign army training and advisory mission. Regarding the use of the 98th, he says, "My impression at the time was that, while it wasn't a perfect solution, there wasn't a better one we could execute given the very clear and compelling timelines we had to operate against." Schwitters states that, in hindsight, he should have been more involved in their predeployment training and, consequently, they developed a training course at Camp Taji to address this shortfall. He notes that initial training of the 98th's soldiers was not very sophisticated, but also that, "The core aspect of what they had to do was something we don't usually do as soldiers - that is, to develop human relationships with individuals and small groups"- something that is more dependent on experience and personality than training. Despite constantly improving logistical support for the advisor support teams (ASTs), he had to continually balance supporting his teams as best as possible with the contrary principle of embedding and living with the Iraqis. Speaking of the effort to create a new Iraqi Army, he says, "The most critical aspect of this whole effort was the operational employment of our Iraqi counterparts….As Iraqi units started to stand up and develop, we had to find partner units that would put their arms around them, bring them into the coalition plan and deploy them within their capabilities and limitations." One problem the ASTs encountered (and which Schwitters tried to minimize) was teams being formed late in the mobilization process, then being reorganized upon arrival in Iraq, severely straining unit cohesion in a stressful environment. Regarding the match of the 98th's soldiers to their assigned mission, Schwitters says, "We needed people who were temperamentally and experientially trained to go in, put their arms around a bunch of folks and develop relationships from which they could then influence action and behavior and develop capabilities. Individuals did that very well in many cases….That doesn't have anything to do with being Reserve Component or Active Army," he added, "but all their training and experience in the institutional training division didn't well equip them for that experience." Schwitters' advice for future commanders who find themselves in similar circumstances is to get involved in the details of training, ensure your organization has a good mix of skill sets, and build functional teams early.

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