Colonel Charles Augustus "Gus" Stafford was the commander of 3rd Brigade, 85th Division (Training Support) at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, from 2004 through 2005 when the 98th Division (Institutional Training) received their predeployment training there. Stafford relates that, after Brigadier General Richard Sherlock had volunteered the 98th for the mission of training and advising the new Iraqi Army, Camp Atterbury was chosen as the 98th's training site because Fort Dix and Camp Shelby were already occupied with other training and mobilization missions. He describes how the training package given to the 98th was an amalgam of standard mobilization prerequisites, directed task lists from Forces Command and Central Command, and training requirements from Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, bearing in mind the training also available in Kuwait. Stafford explains that, while there was a clear delineation between predeployment training at Camp Atterbury and training in theater, this was not clear to the mobilizing soldiers. "To the individual soldiers going through it," he said, "it was muddy as hell. Because of their desire to quickly mobilize and get to theater, it was a constant battle to explain to them that they had to go through certain training before they could get into theater." He notes that training at Camp Atterbury changed as the mission focus of the mobilizing soldiers changed and as enemy tactics in Iraq changed as well. Stafford talks about some of the problems encountered, saying, "In fact, one of the greatest heartaches with the 98th Division was the reorganization that took place within 90 days of arrival. As envisioned and as we were tasked for the mission, they were going over there to do that basic individual squad- and platoon-level training…. The advisor support teams/military transition teams, however, were reorganized on the fly in country for the new mission of going out to be advisors, and that happened after they deployed." He felt there was a bias to overcome between the Active Component and the Guard and Reserves, saying, "The Guard and Reserve folks felt the active duty soldiers didn't trust them … and on the part of the Active Component, they felt the Guard and Reserve didn't have enough training and so they didn't trust their ability to complete a given mission." He talks about how training for MiTTs has completely changed and advocates using a Combat Training Center model to increase their effectiveness. For future commanders, Stafford advises understanding the differences between Active, Guard and Reserve to ease force integration problems.

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