This interview with Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus covers his command of Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 2004 through September 2005, and deals specifically with the deployment of the 98th Division (Institutional Training) to Iraq and the evolving concept of the advisory effort. Right before assuming command of MNSTC-I, at the request of General John Abizaid, Petraeus and other soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division went to Iraq to assess the Iraqi security forces. They found very uneven quality among the forces, a general lack of necessary infrastructure, all sorts of equipment and logistical shortages, and no functional institutions to support them. Following this assessment, Petraeus received a briefing that proposed using one of the institutional training divisions to accomplish the training and advising mission which MNSTC-I was about to undertake. Based on MNSTC-I's joint manning document and request for forces, the 98th Division was identified as the first unit for the training and advisory mission. As Petraeus explains, "There was no active duty division sitting out there that hadn't been tapped at this point in time, so the expectation was that the forces were going to come out of the Reserve Component somewhere." He states that a primary challenge was establishing an ad hoc organization for the training and advisory effort, and the 98th constantly strived to match rank and expertise with requirements. Speaking of the reservists, Petraeus said, "We were just glad to get somebody over there to help us out - and the sooner the better. In some cases," he continued, "the 98th had talent that was just off the charts. For example, we had a comptroller who was an executive vice president with Goldman Sachs, the largest investment banking house in the world." He also added that, since most of the reservists were involved in institutional training and very few had seen combat, they were able to grow in experience along with their Iraqi units. Petraeus notes that the training advisors received before meeting their Iraqi charges continually changed over time, pointing to the Phoenix Academy as an example. Overall, Petraeus assesses the 98th's performance as, "Good. I think they should be justly proud of what they did," adding that, in many cases, it was not possible to distinguish Active from Reserve Component. To future commanders in similar circumstances, he recommends that they read all past lessons learned, learn about the culture in which they will operate and about how the country has worked and should work, and moreover learn a bit of the language. Petraeus closes the interview with praise for the reservists of the 98th.

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