A reservist with the 98th Division (Institutional Training), Major Matthew Jones served as an advisor support team leader in Iraq in 2004-2005. In this interview, he recounts the process of mobilizing a reserve unit for service overseas, describing how their mission was changed from instructors for officers and noncommissioned officers to basic combat training instructors to eventually advisors, and how this affected their deployment training. Jones had previously been an advisor for the Afghan National Army, was familiar with the training package developed for that mission, but noted that the length and content of any deployment training was a heated topic for all concerned. As a result, he describes the training received at Camp Atterbury as "horrible." "They came up with this training package and we fought over how many days each block would be. In the execution of it, though, there turned out to be very little training." That said, Jones recounts that the contractor-provided training they received in Kuwait was quite the opposite, calling it "phenomenal." He voices frustration that, upon arrival in Iraq, the advisory teams which had trained together were completely reorganized and sent to Iraqi units. In his particular case, "they just formed a team out of six people who had never trained together. You got to be kidding me! They'd never worked together and they were now being put in a situation where they would be in contact when they got there. It was unreal." He explains the many challenges his team faced advising an Iraqi Army battalion, including mass desertions. Jones says, "Out of the 750 who went on leave, we picked up 400," adding that, "In that time, we went from 400 soldiers down to 200 because 200 Iraqis walked out the gate the minute we told them we were going to Fallujah. The battalion commander also left and he stole his pistol, his staff car and an AK47. We never saw him again. That wasn't exactly a good day for morale." He further notes that it was difficult getting the Iraqis to train for more than four hours a day; the quick reaction force was used improperly; and basic accountability for soldiers, money and weapons was a constant problem. Despite being at a mere 25 percent strength, Jones' battalion was deployed to Fallujah and he praises the Marines there for training the Iraqis in individual soldier skills, fully incorporating them into operations, and treating the Iraqi officers as peers. He details the operations his battalion conducted in Fallujah, the plethora of arms and munitions in the area, the growing ability of the Iraqis to succeed, and their real talent for acting on human intelligence. Jones closes by stating that the advisory effort can succeed, but only if dedicated, genuine soldiers are chosen for the task.

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