Driven by his desire to be deployed either to Iraq or Afghanistan, and believing that his Connecticut National Guard unit would not be sent, in late 2004 Lieutenant Colonel Paul Ciesinski got himself transferred to the US Army Reserve's 80th Division (Institutional Training), which had recently picked up the advisory mission in Iraq. Eventually becoming the military transition team (MiTT) leader working in western Nineveh Province with 3rd Brigade, 3rd Iraqi Army Division - responsible for developing its commanders and staffs as they conducted counterinsurgency and other operations - perhaps Ciesinski's most daunting challenge was recovering from the "poorly planned and insufficient" predeployment training he and his team received. With respect to counterinsurgency especially, he lamented, "That was our mission essential task in Iraq and there was zero training provided on it." Ciesinski, moreover, expressed astonishment over the Army's "lack of official doctrine on advising," which further contributed to his MiTT being "behind the eight ball before we even left the mobilization station." In spite of this rather inauspicious start, though, he recounts a number of in-country successes, particularly those involving area security and cordon and search missions throughout the battlespace: "Initially these were all American planned and executed with the Iraqis in support," Ciesinski explained, "then it was American planned with the Iraqis in the lead. And by the time we were done, they were Iraqi planned and Iraqi executed." In addition, he discusses a wide range of cultural relations issues (including his effective loss of a captain due to cultural shock), the ups and downs of working with partnership units, and the difficulties of teaching systematic approaches and a true military learning process to Iraqi soldiers and leaders. Ciesinski offers a wealth of advice, not merely for those who may fill similar billets in the future, but also for the Army as a whole: "Advisors simply need to be taught what advisors do," he said. "The biggest thing I can take out of my year there was overcoming the bad start we had and the lack of training we received … and if the Army can fix that now, they'll be able to set their advisors up for success. This is going to be a long term process," Ciesinski concluded, "and we cannot send advisors into country with the level of training we were given."

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