In this wide-ranging interview focusing on his January 2005 through January 2006 deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Colonel (P) Edward Cardon discusses his service as the commander of 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division and his area of responsibility in southern and central Baghdad, home to more than 1.2 million Iraqis. In addition to the five battalions and one cavalry squadron that comprised his normal brigade combat team - 1-76 Field Artillery, 4-64 Armor, 3-7 Infantry, 4-3 Brigade Troops Battalion, 703rd Forward Support Battalion and 6-8 CAV - Cardon also had under his command 1-184 Infantry from the California National Guard; 3-187 Infantry from the 101st Airborne Division; units from 3-325 Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division; 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment; and also an international component in the form of a battalion of Georgians. In addition, Cardon had a working relationship with the naval special warfare task force that guarded the top five officials of the Iraqi government, a number of Iraqi public order and commando brigades, and also the 5th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi Division, which his unit helped stand up from scratch. In great detail, Cardon discusses his five lines of operation: training Iraqi security forces, essential services, governance, the economy and combat operations. Among many other topics, he talks about what motivates insurgent activity and the population to support it; the fact that the "political element" of waging a successful counterinsurgency is presently "broken"; his decision to relieve a battalion commander in theater; the differences between insurgents and terrorists; the burdensome constraints put on him with respect to financial resources and conducting effective psychological operations; as well as the challenges associated with integrating both National Guard and coalition partner units. Cardon also recounts the non-lethal successes of Operation Goodwill, covers a number of subjects related to intelligence gathering, and explains why he thinks "the Army's at war but the US government is not" and the potential consequences thereof. What's more, Cardon relates his interactions with Iraqi political leaders and a variety of media outlets, his views on the ideal deployment length, and what he considers to be the "two greatest threats to the future of Iraq." He discusses the pernicious influence of sectarian militias, his "personal belief that the Ministry of Interior is too powerful while the Ministry of Defense isn't powerful enough," and in closing tells a remarkably instructive story that goes a long way towards explaining the current difficulties in Iraq.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited