Between July 2004 and June 2005, Lieutenant Colonel Ken Adgie served as the operations officer (S3) for the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team. In this capacity, he was intimately involved in the planning and force packaging for Operation Phantom Fury (also known as Al Fajr), the decisive November 2004 operation to retake the Iraqi city of Fallujah. In this interview, Adgie discusses in great detail the packaging and task organization of Task Force 2-2 and stresses the "combined arms mentality" that overlaid all the planners' efforts: "We knew that when it was time to fight enemy, if he stood and fought, we needed to use our combat multipliers: use close air support, use field artillery, use mortars, use your information operations - basically, use everything in the toolbox to kill the enemy." Although not directly involved in the fight proper, Adgie monitored hostilities, "filled requests and needs," and here provides a wealth of insights into how Army units communicated, worked and fought with their Marine Corps counterparts, as well as the course of battle itself: how Task Force 2-2 performed, the enemy forces it encountered and eventually crushed, the actions and leadership of key personnel, and the impact taking casualties (including several officer-level KIAs) had on the operation as a whole.

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