In support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Colonel Peter "Duke" DeLuca commanded the 101st Airborne Division's 326th Engineer Battalion during the major combat phase and then, from June 2004 through June 2005, served as the J7 engineer for Lieutenant General David Petraeus' Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). In this highly detailed and wide-ranging interview, DeLuca discusses, analyzes and offers informed (and quite candid) critiques on the planning for Phase IV stability and support operations; the de-Ba'athification process; the decision to disband the Iraqi Army; the "tremendous military capacity" that was not exploited at key junctures; the tragedy of postwar "over-centralization" and the resulting "winner-take-all situation" that helped fuel the insurgency; as well as the establishment, organization and effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Indeed, as DeLuca noted, "They didn't have any people, no stuff, they couldn't communicate with each other, they couldn’t move around and they couldn’t see and assess, but they had all the authority and all the money and they wouldn’t release it.” Tasked during his MNSTC-I assignment with providing suitable and lasting infrastructure for the support, sustainment and protection of Iraqi security forces by building barracks, police stations, border forts, military academies and the like country-wide, DeLuca ran a $2 billion office and speaks at length about a wealth of contracting and construction issues, revealing that “our force generation of Iraqi soldiers and units was constrained” because facilities weren’t being completed fast enough. In addition, he shares a number of frank and penetrating insights into the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the Army Corps of Engineers.

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