Thesis Statement: The German Army lost its October-December 1941 campaign against Moscow because of three factors. Discussion: Hitler and his military staff overestimated the ability of the German Army and underestimated the ability of the Soviet Army. The Soviet Army was able to field large numbers of replacement forces. The early onset of the severe Russian winter drastically impeded the effectiveness of German Army Group Center. Conclusion: The German Army's campaign against Moscow can serve as a lesson for all commanders and war planners. At a strategic level, commanders must accurately access the abilities and limitations of their own forces. Commanders must have access to reliable intelligence data regarding the capabilities and limitations of the opposing forces. War planners must have accurate data regarding the capability of the opponent to mobilize forces and to produce war materials. Finally, commanders must understand that weather is a critical factor in planning, preparing for, and conducting combat operations.

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