There is a significant amount of literature discussing the "Russian way of war" and what strategic goals the Russians would attain using non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). In contrast, there is almost no literature exploring what the use of these weapons would look like at the operational or tactical level against NATO ground forces. This analysis focuses on why and how Russia would employ low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons (LYBNW), a specific subset of NSNW. It explores in what context the Russian military would use LYBNW in a tactical sense to achieve strategic objectives and what that risk is to NATO forces. Specifically, the research answers: How should the US and NATO ground forces understand and respond to the threat posed by Russian LYBNW in the EUCOM area of responsibility? To answer how and if Russia will employ LYBNW against ground forces, a threat analysis methodology is used. This method analyzes two concepts: intent and capability. A brief risk assessment with a hypothetical scenario is conducted to synthesize and contextualize the threat analysis. The scenario will aid in assessing the likelihood and consequences of the Russian use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons.

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