China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often portrayed as a grand design to displace US presence by diplomatic and economic means, but perhaps this interpretation is exaggerated. Indeed, China's vision for the twenty-first century entails national rejuvenation by 2049. Should China's vision succeed, Americans should be concerned, as China's authoritarian system directly conflicts with US interests and values. A critical aspect of China's strategic approach is using non-military means through its BRI to gain and maintain access to strategic regions. Yet, despite the seeming effectiveness in gaining influence through non-military means, diplomacy and economics alone have distinct limitations. This monograph evaluates the effectiveness of diplomatic and economic instruments in gaining and maintaining access to desired theaters via Pakistan in two case studies. The first assesses US use of diplomatic and economic means after September 11, 2001 to gain and maintain operational access for the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. The second seeks to understand how China's use of diplomatic and economic activity through the BRI allow it to gain and maintain operational access to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Ultimately, this monograph argues that perceptions of national interests are more important in determining a nation's relationship with great powers than merely the diplomatic and economic instruments such powers can orchestrate. Where interests align, diplomacy and economics can help achieve operational access; but where interests diverge, these instruments are unlikely to have the desired effects and tend to produce resentment at perceived violations of national sovereignty.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)