The Army has failed to curb the issue of suicide within its formations, despite a renewed focus on the topic and increased emphasis by senior leaders. The goal of this monograph is to explore the environment surrounding suicide to identify potential reasons for this failing. Numerous revisions of the Army's suicide prevention programs have had limited impact on the rate of suicide and understanding the issues around suicide in the Army could help understand why these programs have not succeeded. The information used throughout this monograph is based on existing data and analysis of great research as well as experience with suicides in the Army and numerous suicide prevention boards and working groups. With a new review of the available data through the lens of personal experience, the intent is to determine if there is a disconnect between suicide and suicide prevention. As the suicide rates in the Army continue to rise the Army must strive to develop a better understanding of the problem and how to address it.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)