In Great Power Competition, adversaries employ a variety of strategies and systems expanding the battlefield, challenging deterrence, and creating stand-off to separate joint capabilities, partners, and allies in time, space, and function. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is the US Army's core concept to adapt and modernize as part of the joint force in response to perceived changes in warfare. This monograph inquires how historical examples might assist the US Army in understanding the application of the tenets of MDO. This project aims to demonstrate that historical examples illustrate how politics guide the employment of domain capabilities in theaters of war, enabling convergence in wars of final victory and wars of limited aims. This study uses a comparative case study methodology to demonstrate the establishment of convergence. The monograph evaluates the hypothesis through two criteria: political guidance and constraints on domain capabilities, and the application of domain capabilities across the theater of war. The research analyzes and synthesizes differences and patterns across Operation Iceberg from the Second World War and Operation Desert Storm from the Persian Gulf War. The study illustrates how initial political guidance constrained resources and the use of military force, limiting the employment of domain capabilities through time and space.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)