The US Navy and US Marine Corps desires unity of effort in maritime expeditions which complement the joint force, and history offers a lens to synthesize elements of effective or ineffective expeditionary operations. In one case, the strategic, operational, and tactical success of John Paul Jones during the Whitehaven expedition in 1778 represents doctrinal application of all contemporary elements of seapower. It demonstrated tenets of commerce raiding, coastal raiding, and fleet engagements culminating in decreased British domestic support for the war against the American Revolution. In another case, the Allied seizure of Sicily, Operation Husky in 1943 represents doctrinal dissonance among services eventually rectified through cooperation between the US Army and US Navy to support sea control and power projection. Finally, the British seizure of the Falkland Islands, Operation Corporate in 1982 represents doctrinal compatibility but capability gaps mitigated though coordinated efforts between the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force and Commander of the Landing Force. This study examines the relationship between doctrine, capabilities, and Multi-Domain Operations through the lens of seapower. The study uses a structured, focused comparison of the Whitehaven expedition, Operation Husky, and Operation Corporate. The questions focus on doctrinal alignment, command and support relationships, capability employment, and gaps and mitigation measures in domain superiority. The analysis demonstrates that doctrinal alignment is critical to the success of Multi-Domain Operations. Capability gaps can be mitigated to address shortfalls in domain superiority. All-domain superiority is not essential to the operational success of a campaign, though an operational artist accepts risk and fights from a position of disadvantage. The research is significant because it addresses the importance of nesting the US Navy doctrine of Composite Warfare Command with the US Marine Corps Operating Concept as the Marine Corps breaks the current Marine Air-Ground Task Force model in support of seapower.

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