Deception is a means to create distinct advantage on the battlefield for the commander who employs it. A commander that utilizes deception operations can hide the disposition and size of forces at the tactical level of war. Deception also allows the deceiver to mask military and political intent at the strategic and operational levels of war. Executing deception properly requires understanding of the enemy's perceptions and the channels from which they receive information. This basis allows the operational artist to attempt to manipulate enemy through what he sees, his perception and the basis for his actions. In an age of information proliferation, deception is a powerful tool at the operational artist's disposal. History demonstrates that military deception is most effectively employed when the deception plan targets a theater-level decision maker or political decision-maker at the highest level of governance. Decision-makers at the political/strategic or theater level have the authorities to make the decisions that achieve the goals of a deception plan. Two case studies provide evidence of this. Utilizing the criteria of "see, think, do": Operation FORTITUDE conducted by the Allies in World War II and Operation SPARK conducted by the Egyptians during the Yom Kippur War illustrate the relevance of the hypothesis. The evidence of Operation FORTITUDE demonstrates that Adolf Hitler was the appropriate deception target. The evidence also demonstrates that his perception of the Pas de Calais as an Allied deception landing site aided in the creation of the conditions that allowed the success of Operation FORTITUDE. Similarly, evidence of the Egyptian deception in Operation SPARK illustrated that the Egyptians targeted the correct decision-maker, Prime Minister Golda Meir. In addition to the selection of the correct deception target, Operation SPARK found further success in its exploitation of the Israeli belief that Egypt was unwilling and incapable to utilize war to achieve its political aims. The conclusion drawn from the case studies is that the authorities of the decision-maker are of primary importance to successful deception at the political/strategic and operational levels of war.

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