This monograph examines how the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization employed air power to obtain national objectives in Operation Linebacker II, Operation Deliberate Force, and Operation Allied Force. Operation Linebacker II took place from 18-29 December 1972. It was the only maximum effort bombing campaign of the Vietnam War that targeted the heartland of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, ultimately compelling the negotiations that ended the conflict. Operation Deliberate Force, the final operation of the Balkans Air Campaign, was a seventeen-day effort that sought to undermine the military capability of the Bosnian Serb Army and led to the 1995 Dayton Accords. Operation Allied Force was a seventy-eight-day air campaign in 1999 that successfully sustained offensive operations against Serbian forces led by president Slobodan Milošević and impelled their removal from Kosovo. This monograph primarily uses Dr. Mark Clodfelter's Framework for Evaluating AirPower Effectiveness as a means to evaluate these campaigns and test the hypothesis that an air campaign positively impacts national objectives when it effectively targets an enemy's military vulnerabilities in which it has no equal means of response. These case studies demonstrate air power's ability to obtain or positively contribute to the achievement of national objectives when used as the predominate or sole means of combat power. Findings indicate that while effective targeting was crucial to these campaigns, there were other factors of equal or greater importance. Although each case study provides unique insights to the effective use of air power in pursuit of national objectives, common themes for all three include the evolution of national objectives to match military capability, the isolation of the adversary from its perceived allies, and a type of war waged by the adversary conducive to targeting or exploitation by air power.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)