This monograph contends military governance is an inescapable, crucial aspect of war into which the US military, specifically the Army, must pour effort, resources, and excellence to ensure that our wars are worth winning in the first place. Strategic, competent governance subdues chaos and provides dignity and paths forward to populations reeling from the loss and devastation of war. The monograph reviews how military governance figured in to large-scale combat operations including the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Dominican Crisis, and contemporary conflict including Iraq and Afghanistan. The monograph utilizes a single case study, the World War II Rhineland Campaign: 1943-1945, to analyze how the US military executed its largest military governance operation. The vast body of research on this topic can be distilled down to this simple yet profound consensus point: the US military must plan and prepare for the execution of military governance duties with the same, or perhaps greater, level of care, forethought, and vision the conflict itself required. Action must be taken in accordance with the DOTMLPF framework to address military governance prior to the next conflict. Ignoring the requirement prior to war would be both consistent with our tradition and to our peril. The United States military has only completed half of the task on the day we proclaim our victories. The other half, the military governance piece, will test our competencies, our patience, and our resolve. A war is not truly won if the communities left in the wake are treated as afterthoughts.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)