During WWII and the Persian Gulf War, the US Army synchronized operational fires from the land, air, and maritime domains during Large-Scale Combat Operations. The mechanism was the corps artillery, the single organization with the requisite authority, capability, and capacity to do so. Inadvertently, historical accounts of both conflicts primarily focus on the corps as a whole and do not evaluate the impact of its subordinate corps artillery. Consequently, as the Army prepares to employ Multi-Domain Operations beyond 2028, its operational fires capability is non-existent. Inactivation of the corps artillery to provide manpower for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan removed all means. Hence, this study conducts a comparison of VII Corps Artillery during LSCO to inform the future of Army multi-domain operational fires. Furthermore, the empirical evidence examined supports this monograph's thesis that peer threats dictate that the Army must establish the Operational Fires Command or expanded corps artillery.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)