The United States and Soviet Union both entered Afghanistan for vastly different reasons, and both nations struggled mightily adjusting their operational approaches to meet the problems encountered. This monograph examines the 40th Army's withdrawal from Afghanistan and discusses issues US planners and commanders are currently experiencing in Afghanistan. The elements of operational art provide a useful tool in examining the operational approach the 40th Army used to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. The 40th Army's planners utilized the elements of operational art to great effect in some situations and ignored them to their peril in other instances. This monograph addresses conceptually how the Soviet's framework can be applied, and when their framework should be avoided by US planners in Afghanistan.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)