During the last eighteen years of persistent conflict in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the primary duties for the US Army's Field Artillery units changed from providing fires to conducting nonstandard missions. While necessary to assist during multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, this led to the atrophy of core competencies, and Field Artillery units ability to provide indirect fires. In the intervening period since 2001 adversaries studied the way US forces deploy, operate, adapt, and modernize. As the US Army shifts its focus to large-scale combat operations, the lessons available from the Russian-Ukrainian War provide examples of how potential peer adversaries developed their fires and Field Artillery capability. This research intends to identify capability gaps the US Army could exploit in future conflicts and mitigate weaknesses with changes to doctrine, organization, or training. Each section of this monograph compares the doctrine, organization, and training of Integrated Fires Commands (IFC) and US Army divisions and division artillery (DIVARTYs) while recommending solutions to mitigate the gap between them. To mitigate gaps the US Army will need to complete proposed long-range precision fires modernization and implementation of the Division Fires Command (DFC). Implementation of the Division Fires Command will optimize fires for large-scale operations and ensure that the US Army is prepared for future conflicts.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)