In June of 1969, the Vietnamization strategy introduced by the Nixon administration aimed to end American involvement in the Vietnam War. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACY) planners using the tenets of operational art knew the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) could not deal successfully with a combined Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NV A) threat in South Vietnam without a residual US advisor presence. On January 23, 1973, the Nixon administration accomplished its primary political aim agreeing to a cease-fire agreement with North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the government of South Vietnam. The United States would no longer provide advisors or air support to influence the outcome. Reliant on technology and firepower the RVNAF were unable to sustain their forces trained in US tactics and doctrine. In the end, without support from the United States, the government of South Vietnam was unable to make the political, military, economic, and social changes needed to defend their sovereignty as a nation. The approach used during Vietnamization reveals lessons learned for the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to improve combat effectiveness by providing extensive training, logistical assistance, and coordinated air support. As with Vietnam, no matter the military effort only the Iraqi and Afghan governments can make the necessary changes required for sustained success in their countries.

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