Under current mission command doctrine, one of the primary decisions made by commanders is the allocation of resources to weight the main effort, extend operational reach, and exploit operational success. These issues were the rationale for the Army of Excellence logistics structure. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Army transformed the logistics structure to a single supply chain distribution-based system. All logistics organizations were removed from the division structure and placed under command of the theater sustainment command. As the Army returns to a focus on sustained conventional combat, the question becomes can the current division logistics organization properly sustain a division in sustained conventional combat? Comparing the Army of Excellence logistics structure to the modular structure revealed that the most significant difference between the structures was the removal of the Division Support Command which eliminated the division's capability to integrate logistics. Assessing the removal of integration function against the Supply Chain Operations Reference model shows the effects of removing the division's organic logistics capability. The removal of the logistics integration function from the division removes the ability of the commander to balance logistics assets across the formation, removes the habitual logistics relationships that enabled success in the Iraq invasion, and removes the ability to internally synchronize logistics with maneuver. Based on these shortfalls, the current division logistics organization cannot supply the division in sustained conventional combat.

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