Operation Just Cause, the United States intervention in Panama that overthrew the regime of Manuel Noriega, was an outstanding operational success. It was quick, limited, and involved few casualties. The United States destroyed Panama's military, captured the seat of power, and installed a new government within the first few days. In addition, with the benefit of hindsight, it represented an unqualified strategic success. Panama is a stable democracy, and the United States enjoys good relations with it. This monograph attempts to explain why. By examining the Panama case using a model of regime change, this monograph will consider whether the US intervention in Panama was truly successful, and (if so) what led to that success. It shows how the planning and execution of the operation interacted with other factors to determine the strategic outcome and identifies three cases where US actions were decisive to the outcome. Finally, it identifies two implications for future military planners dealing with regime change.

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