The study of force ratios, particularly those intended for application in the counterinsurgency environment, reveals an element of the greater issue of military thinking. After the failures of Vietnam, the US military machine reimagined their brand to exclude the intrusions of politics within military decision-making. These particular ideas manifested themselves in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and Samuel Huntington's theory of objective control of the military. Both of these popular modes of thinking provided similar intuitive outlets for military professionals to continue separating the political realm from military action. Within the context of this time period John T. Quinlivan produced research suggesting that success in a counterinsurgency environment rested in an optimum force ratio applied to the problem. He produced the basis for US military planning models with the twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants ratio for counterinsurgencies. More recently, John McGrath expounded upon Quinlivan's work but largely reached a similar conclusion concerning the value of the force ratio. Quinlivan and McGrath missed a critical element when attempting to discover a historical continuity for success in a counterinsurgency environment. Using the method of popular military logic, they both left out the political realm and isolated the detection of a solution to solely military aspects of historical examples. In doing so, they both committed the miscalculation of using history as a dogmatic lessons learned model instead of employing history as an analytical tool for evaluating action. The application of both Quinlivan and McGrath's theories on specific historical anomalies like the French Algerian War and the Kenyan Emergency exposed gaps in the theories themselves. Additionally, the analysis displayed that a historical continuity did in fact exist; however, it occurred in the realm of political actions and decisions. The revelation of qualitative analysis, which involved incorporating the political realm into military decisions in a counterinsurgency environment, produced several recommendations for future planners and operational artists. First, due to the political nature of a counterinsurgency, the military needs to structure military objectives to support core political objectives. Next, empathy toward the population is not equivalent to gaining popular support. The historical pattern suggests that leveraging the critical political aspects of war, such as the control and distribution of arable land in the case of the Mau Mau Rebellion, may be a more critical factor than treating the population with dignity and respect. Finally, in order to react properly to rapid changes in the environment, agents with political authority need to be at all levels of the fight. This may include a tactical action arm that is equivalent or comparable to the military's own response.

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