With the introduction of MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations (UN), for the first time in its history, began unilateral targeted offensive operations. The purpose of this study is to examine how the intervention brigade, with its extended authorities, contributes to the UN's strategic objectives for stability in the DRC. This paper examines the intervention brigade through the lens of strategy using Lykke's model of ends, ways, means, and risk. According to Lykke, a successful strategy mitigates risk by balancing ends, ways, and means. The study concludes that the intervention brigade represents an imbalance of ends, ways, and means in MONUSCO's strategy. According to Lykke's model, the intervention brigade is a suitable strategy, but it is not feasible and may not be acceptable. The brigade's ends align with MONUSCO's, but its resources are insufficient and its methods may be counterproductive to MONUSCO's objectives. Further research is necessary to determine if MONUSCO can reduce risk by rebalancing its strategy or by separating the intervention brigade's offensive mission from MONUSCO's defensive one.

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