In September 2016, military forces of several western nations were conducting operations aimed at developing host nation forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali. For years, in those scenarios, part of the effort to eliminate endemic insurgencies has been to raise and employ indigenous troops, which is probably one of the hardest military tasks in building local capabilities. From that perspective, the Spanish experience in Northern Morocco from 1909 to 1927 is one of those cases worthy of examination. When Spain assumed the establishment of a protectorate in 1912, its army faced a large and persistent insurgency. Extensive documentation exists concerning the Spanish operations in Northern Morocco. However, not much has been written about the impact that the creation and employment of indigenous troops had in relation to it. To fight such an enemy, the Spanish authorities soon established different models of regular and irregular indigenous-based units to secure and stabilize the country. The Indigenous Police, the Indigenous Regular Forces (Regulares), and the Xeriffian Mehal-la were of special importance. Developing such organizations was not without difficulties and setbacks. The performance of the indigenous units varied because they responded to three different conceptualizations of how to employ indigene-based organizations. Not only all of them developed different systems of recruitment, they also organized their units in unique manners to meet the requirements of the fight they were facing. Concerning their organization, the Spanish experience in Morocco serves to illustrate the impact of competition for manpower among organizations. It also exemplifies the dichotomy existing between quality and quantity and how, in order to maintain the adequate numbers ensuring combat capability, all forces had to reduce their standards of recruitment. Relevant for today's operations, the performance of the Spanish personnel participating in the development of the three models heavily influenced the process. The vicissitudes of the Indigenous Police offer a good case study concerning the employment of law-enforcement organizations in counterinsurgency. Increasingly used for military purposes, it eventually suffered from organizational degeneration because it abandoned its original mission. The Regulares and the Mehal-la were part of a flexible operational system mixing cavalry and light infantry units. Both were well-trained and cohesive organizations. However, the latter enjoyed a more patient and progressive development, which ultimately increased its performance and avoided major setbacks throughout the years. Because the three organizations coexisted, their interaction affected the pacification effort when considered as a whole. As a result, their performance over time differed depending on the operational environment's conditions and the ability of the Spanish authorities to integrate the capabilities each of them provided to the overall counterinsurgency effort. Finally, only the adjustment of operational tempo to the environment's conditions permitted true tribal adhesion to the protectorate's authorities. By October 1927, the Spanish protectorate's pacification ended because a very efficient indigenous-based system had slowly but relentlessly penetrated the tribes within the Northern Morocco. Developing such a system is not an easy endeavor. Over time, it requires a holistic view of the all the factors shaping the organization of the different models of forces.

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