This monograph uses the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz's method of critical analysis to analyze Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, focusing on how Army and joint fires enabled maneuver at the operational level. The planning and execution of joint fires at the operational level differed in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom primarily due to two factors: the differing strategic end states of removing the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in Desert Storm versus removing the Iraqi Baath regime from power in Operation Iraqi Freedom; and the increased emphasis in Operation Iraqi Freedom on joint fires supporting operational maneuver versus the largely independent land and air campaigns of Operation Desert Storm. The US Army should continue to study how Army and joint fires, combined with operational level maneuver, enabled land forces to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in its most recent campaigns. This understanding will both preserve the Army's hard-won institutional warfighting knowledge and inform plans for future unified land operations.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)