The jihadists, represented by the globally minded Al Qaeda, declared war on the West when Osama Bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998. Their stated strategic aims were first to remove foreign presence from Islamic lands, revolt against the apostate repressive regimes within the Middle East and former Islamic Caliphate territory, and declare a new Islamic Caliphate based on the seventh-century interpretations of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad's life. Subsequent terrorist attacks did not persuade the United States to abandon its positions in the Middle East, and on one fateful day, 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda brought their transnational rebellion into the forefront of the global stage. After the attacks, the United States increased its presence in the Middle East and began a quest to eradicate the perpetrators of that heinous act. In the wake of this strategically ill-conceived, yet tactically spectacular event the jihadists went in search for a broader approach to attain their strategic goals. Through numerous documents and writings of strategists and leaders within the jihad community, it has become evident that they have decided on an operational approach based on Mao Tse-Tung's successful protracted war model. The jihadists seek to achieve similar success on a global scale as Mao did within China. The core of the jihadist threat currently faced by the world is ideologically based, similar in many ways to the threat posed by Soviet communism after World War II. The astute analysis of George Kennan of the virulent and expansionist brand of communism the Soviet Union practiced is an excellent model to frame an assessment of the radical jihadist version of Islam faced today. Understanding the ideology, strategy, operational approach, and how they attempt to orchestrate actions in time and space are necessary to formulate a comprehensive transnational counter-strategy. Jihadists do not, and have not possessed complete unity in their ranks. The closest they have ever come was immediately following Al Qaeda's spectacular success in 2001. Since then jihadist organizations have been hunted, plagued by in-fighting, and on the run worldwide. The United States attempt at disaggregation culminating in the Surge in Iraq and death of Osama bin Laden were successful, but the results were not exactly as anticipated. Ideas do not die cleanly, if at all. The resurgence of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and now the breakaway jihadist group ISIS have presented new challenges that require continual assessment and adoption of a sustainable long-term approach to address them successfully. A review of the past provides useful insight into the nature of the current threat and successful methods to addressing ideological threats.

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