Current army doctrine provides a guide for the integration of conventional and special operations forces in combat, but provides little direction to guide the integration of conventional and special operations forces in a peacetime training environment. This monograph seeks to determine if and how the US Army should formalize the integration of conventional forces and special operations forces in training for the complex future. By analyzing instances of integration of conventional and special operations forces in the first two years of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, this monograph concludes that peacetime integration in training should be emphasized more, particularly at the combat training centers. Because of the uncertainty inherent in the future operating environment, a formal model for this integration in training could not be developed. Regardless, an increase in integration of conventional and special operations forces in training will inherently provide a common understanding that can be applied to integration in combat.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)